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INTRODUCTION
Linda Bodewig enjoyed her job as a cashier at her local K-Mart
in Oregon, and she had worked there without incident until the
evening of March 29, 1979.1 That evening, she was ringing up the
sale of some curtains for a customer named Alice Golden, but when
she called out the price, Golden told her that the curtains were on
sale and that Bodewig was overcharging her.2 Bodewig asked a
coworker to go check the price of the curtains, and as Golden accompanied the coworker to go to the aisle where the curtains were
displayed, Bodewig set aside Golden’s purchases and continued to
check out other waiting customers.3
Golden returned about ten minutes later, and then asked Bodewig what she had done with her money.4 Bodewig replied, “What
money?” and Golden answered that she had left twenty dollars on
top of the merchandise she had stacked on the counter, and that it
was now missing.5 Golden became loud and argumentative, which
soon attracted the attention of the K-Mart manager.6 After a check
of the surrounding area and an audit of the cash register revealed
no missing money, the manager then told Bodewig to accompany a
female assistant manager to the women’s public restroom, where
she would be strip-searched in order to prove to Golden that she
didn’t have the money on her person.7 Golden was allowed to watch
as Bodewig removed all her clothes except her underwear, at which
point Golden said further disrobing was unnecessary, as she could
see through Bodewig’s underwear and there was no money there.8
Bodewig then returned to her work station at the checkout counter and completed her shift.9 When Bodewig came back to work the
next day, however, she was told to work her register along with a
second employee, which Bodewig understood to mean that she was
under surveillance.10 Angry and embarrassed, Bodewig quit her job
1. The paraphrased description of this incident is taken from Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc.,
635 P.2d 657, 658–60 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
2. Id. at 658–59.
3. Id. at 659.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 660.
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at the K-Mart when her shift ended that day.11 But rather than
simply moving on, Linda Bodewig brought a tort action in the Oregon court for intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking
damages against both her former employer and Golden.12 Bodewig,
a modest woman in her twenties, alleged that as a result of her
being subjected to a strip search and close monitoring by her employer, she experienced “two or three sleepless nights, cried a lot
and still [got] nervous and upset when she [thought] about the incident.”13
Like numerous other courts around the country, the Oregon
courts had recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by the time Linda Bodewig brought her claim.14 Indeed,
the notion that an employee could seek damages for the tort of outrageous conduct on the part of his or her employer was being increasingly accepted in many state courts in the 1970s. In one of the
first major cases, the 1970 decision of Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering,
Inc., the California Supreme Court held that the tort claim could
succeed where an employer simply condoned the use of profane and
abusive epithets made by a supervisor to his employees.15 Other
courts soon followed California’s lead in taking a broad view of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.16 But Virginia
courts would not be among them. For although the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized in Virginia, the
standards for successfully making the claim are extraordinarily
high. While some state courts seem to have readily embraced the
tort, Virginia courts have largely looked with disfavor on intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
This Article first traces the development of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as applied to the workplace in the
Commonwealth of Virginia in Part I, and offers some observations
about the significant hurdles a plaintiff may face in trying to successfully hold an employer accountable for conduct that many in

11. Id.
12. Id. at 658, 660.
13. Id. at 662.
14. See, e.g., Rockhill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 28, 29 (Or. 1971).
15. 468 P.2d 216, 217–18 (Cal. 1970).
16. For a comprehensive look at (and critique of) the emergence of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the workplace, see Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against “Tortification” of Labor
and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (1994).
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our society would deem unacceptable. After reviewing the evolution of the doctrine since it was first recognized in Virginia nearly
fifty years ago in Part II, Part III returns to the incident described
above involving Linda Bodewig and her employer, and offers an
analysis of how her case would likely be decided in the Virginia
courts today—and whether that decision would be the right one.
I. EARLY RECOGNITION OF DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN
VIRGINIA TORT CLAIMS
The term “emotional distress” is not self-defining, and is one that
historically has been viewed with some skepticism.17 This part
traces the origins of tort claims for emotional distress in Virginia
to show how the courts first dealt with the issue in the context of
negligence and defamation claims, and how that analysis foreshadowed the development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. As will be explored in the next section, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is a relatively recent
phenomenon, one that presents difficult issues, including what
counts as “severe emotional distress” and how to calculate damages. However, it is important to note that damages for emotional
distress had been sought by plaintiffs seeking recovery using traditional tort claims in Virginia for many years before the emergence of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
One of the first Virginia cases to consider the question of
whether the tort of negligence on the part of a defendant might
subject him or her to damages arising from emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff is Connelly v. Western Union Telegraph Co.18 In
that 1902 case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized the claim of negligently inflicted emotional distress, but
added that “mental anguish and suffering resulting from mere negligence, unaccompanied with injuries to the person, cannot be
made the basis of an action for damages.”19 The plaintiff Connelly
had not alleged any physical injury, only shock and outrage for the
failure of Western Union to timely notify him of his father’s death
17. See, e.g., David J. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by
Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 163–64 (1976–77) (noting that courts were
initially reluctant to accept the idea of damages for emotional distress in the late 19th and
early 20th century, reflecting the view that “insanity and other emotional illnesses were
considered to be the result of one’s own sins”).
18. Connelly v. W. Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51, 53, 40 S.E. 618, 619 (1902).
19. Id. at 55, 65, 40 S.E. at 620, 624.
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and subsequent funeral, and so the court dismissed his claim.20
This became known as the “physical impact rule,” which limited
the ability of plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress
in negligence cases.21
In addition to negligence claims, the Virginia courts considered
the question of damages for emotional distress in defamation cases.
The 1932 case of Bowles v. May22 is illustrative. In that case, a defamation claim was brought by a husband who was upset with his
neighbor, Bowles, who had entered his house and insulted his wife,
Mrs. May.23 The plaintiff also claimed that Bowles had spread rumors among their neighbors about his wife’s alleged infidelity.24 A
few days after this incident, Mrs. May suffered a stroke, and her
husband sought damages for her mental suffering.25
Although the court focused primarily on the question of whether
a qualified privilege to defamation on the part of the defendant
Bowles existed, the court went on to address the issue of independent recovery for willfully inflicted emotional distress, stating:
There is a sharp conflict in the authorities as to whether there can be
a recovery for fright or mental shock unaccompanied by contemporaneous injury when the action is based upon mere negligence. However,
it seems settled in Virginia that there can be no recovery for mental

20. Id. at 67, 40 S.E. at 624. The court adhered to the common law rule that damages
for emotional distress alone, as an independent cause of action, were never allowed. The
court added, however, that where there is a personal injury, emotional distress is a proper
element of damages. Id. at 55, 40 S.E. at 620.
21. Although most states recognize a cause of action in tort for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, a minority of them adhere to the “physical impact rule,” which requires
a contemporaneous physical injury or impact to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of
Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 792 (1988). “The purpose of the rule requiring physical impact is to prevent ‘illusory or imaginative or faked’
claim.” Id. at 791 (quoting Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d. 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961));
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Today, the
majority of states apply either the “zone of danger” or “physical manifestation” rules. See
Marlowe, supra at 796–98, 796 n.91; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436,
436A. The zone of danger rule permits recovery for emotional injuries resulting from witnessing physical harm to another or from fearing physical harm to oneself, provided that
plaintiff was actually threatened by physical harm. Marlowe, supra at 794, 799. The physical manifestation rule requires that a plaintiff exhibit a physical injury or symptom as the
“direct and natural result of the initial emotional distress” suffered. Id. at 795.
22. 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932).
23. Id. at 424–28, 166 S.E. at 551–53.
24. Id. at 425, 166 S.E. at 552.
25. Id. at 424–26, 166 S.E. at 552.
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anguish and suffering resulting from negligence unaccompanied by
contemporaneous physical injuries to the person.26

Rejecting the argument that calculating mental injuries is too
difficult an endeavor for a court or a jury to undertake, and that
the damages would more often be more assumed than real, the
Bowles court held that
severe mental shock may be the direct and proximate cause of wreck
to the nervous system, the consequence of which may be a visible
physical injury. When such fright is due to a wilful [sic], wanton and
vindictive wrong, recovery is generally permitted, notwithstanding
the fact that there is no contemporaneous injury from without.27

However, the court held that Mr. May did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Bowles’ statements caused Mrs. May’s
stroke, and reversed the trial court’s ruling in Bowles’ favor.28
Returning to negligence claims, the “physical impact rule” announced in Connelly v. Western Union Telegraph Co.29 continued
until 1973, when the Supreme Court of Virginia decided the case
of Hughes v Moore.30 In that case, Toy Hughes crashed his car into
the front porch of one Sue Etta Moore, who was standing inside her
house looking through the window when she heard and saw
Hughes’ car crash right in front of her.31 Moore sued Hughes for
personal injury, and Moore’s physician testified at her trial that
she was “experiencing physical pain in her body from the emotional
disturbance and that her condition presented a serious mental
problem.”32 He added that “[t]he pain was real, and ‘not imaginary.’”33 Her physician further opined that “there was a ‘causal
connection’ between the automobile striking plaintiff’s home and
her emotional and physical condition.”34
The Hughes court noted that Virginia courts had permitted recovery in the past for mental distress and physical injuries unaccompanied by actual physical contact where the injuries were

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 433, 166 S.E. at 555.
Id. at 433, 437, 166 S.E. at 555–56.
Id. at 437–38, 166 S.E. at 557.
100 Va. 51, 53–54, 40 S.E. 618, 619 (1902).
214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
Id. at 28, 197 S.E.2d at 215.
Id. at 28–29, 197 S.E.2d at 215–16.
Id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216.

$//5(''2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2019]

$0

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS

289

caused by a willful, intentional tort.35 The Hughes court cited as
authority for the proposition that mental distress and physical injuries unaccompanied by actual physical contact could be grounds
for recovery the earlier case of Moore v. Jefferson Hospital, Inc.36
There, the actions of a hospital employee named Phyllis Hatter
who entered an operating room and prevented a physician from
performing surgery on the plaintiff were held to constitute an intentional tort on her part, which, even without actual physical contact with the plaintiff, caused him physical and mental injury.37
The Hughes court then set out the new standard for negligence
liability, rejecting the earlier “physical impact rule” (i.e., that a
plaintiff could recover for emotional distress manifesting itself
physically, but only if the negligence that caused the emotional distress also caused contemporaneous physical injury).38 The court
held:
[W]here conduct is merely negligent, not willful, wanton, or vindictive,
and physical impact is lacking, there can be no recovery for emotional
disturbance alone. We hold, however, that where the claim is for emotional disturbance and physical injury resulting therefrom, there may
be recovery for negligent conduct, notwithstanding the lack of physical
impact, provided the injured party properly pleads and proves by clear
and convincing evidence that his physical injury was the natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence. In other words, there may be recovery in such a case if, but only
if, there is shown a clear and unbroken chain of causal connection between the negligent act, the emotional disturbance, and the physical
injury.39

The court concluded that Sue Etta Moore’s inability to feed her
baby due to a lack of milk, the onset of her menstrual period while
she was nursing, and her diminishing breasts—all resulting from
her nervousness after witnessing Toy Hughes’ car crash into her
home—constituted physical injuries naturally resulting from
fright and shock.40 Thus, Hughes clarified that a plaintiff need not
suffer contemporaneous physical injury (i.e., physical impact) to
recover for emotional distress so long as the emotional distress
35. Id. at 29–30, 197 S.E.2d at 216–17.
36. Id. at 29–30, 197 S.E.2d at 216–17 (citing Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., Inc., 208
Va. 438, 158 S.E.2d 124 (1967)).
37. Moore, 208 Va. at 441, 158 S.E.2d at 126–27.
38. Hughes, 214 Va. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
39. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219. In this way, the Virginia court joined the majority of
jurisdictions in abandoning the “physical impact rule.” See supra note 21.
40. Hughes, at 28–29, 35, 197 S.E.2d at 215, 220.

$//5(''2&; '2127'(/(7( 

290

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

$0

[Vol. 54:283

physically manifested itself and there was an “unbroken chain of
causal connection between the negligent act, the emotional disturbance, and the physical injury.”41
The evolution of mental distress claims arising from negligence,
then, is one that gradually tipped more in favor of the plaintiff.
Specifically, the abandonment of the “physical impact rule” in favor of a rule that looked at the natural consequences of witnessing
something distressing meant that more plaintiffs could recover
damages. That evolution might have boded well for plaintiffs when
the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress just one year later; after all,
if the court was willing to broaden the chances for plaintiffs to win
damages for mental distress in the context of negligence claims,
they might be willing to do so in other contexts as well. But as will
be explained below, such was not to be the case.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIMS IN VIRGINIA
Up until the mid-1970s, plaintiffs in Virginia could only recover
damages for emotional distress arising from negligence cases, or
the occasional defamation cases. But new possibilities opened up
in 1974 when the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress for the first time in
Womack v. Eldridge.42
The specific facts of this case are remarkable. Rosalie Eldridge
was employed by Richard Seifert and his attorney to obtain a photograph of Danny Lee Womack. Seifert’s attorney planned to use
Womack’s photograph “as evidence in the trial of Seifert, who was
charged with sexually molesting two young boys.”43 In order to obtain a photograph of Womack, Rosalie Eldridge went to his home,
telling him she was “a Mrs. Jackson from the newspaper and that
she was writing an article on Skateland,” where Womack worked
as a coach.44 He agreed to have her take his picture, and that photograph was later used as one of a series presented in court to the

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974).
Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146.
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child victims of abuse in an effort to have them identify the perpetrator.45 Thus, Womack, who had absolutely no connection to the
child molestation case, was placed in the position of possibly being
accused by the victims in open court of committing a heinous
crime.46 Even though the young boys did not identify Womack as
the perpetrator, Womack argued that the mere use of his image in
the court proceeding under these circumstances was outrageous
conduct, falsely implicating him as a possible child molester.47
The court recognized Womack’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and set forth the elements of the claim as follows:
[A] cause of action will lie for emotional distress, unaccompanied by
physical injury, provided four elements are shown: One, the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless. This element is satisfied
where the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional
distress or where he intended his specific conduct and knew or should
have known that emotional distress would likely result. Two, the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. This requirement
is aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoiding litigation in situations where only bad manners and mere hurt feelings are involved.
Three, there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional distress. Four, the emotional distress was severe.48

The court held that a plaintiff could recover in the absence of physical injury.49
Applying the four elements of the tort, the court found that there
was evidence that Eldridge’s conduct was extreme and outrageous,
that a reasonable person would have “recognized the likelihood of
the serious mental distress that would be caused in involving an
innocent person [like Womack] in [a] child molest[ation] case[],”
and that Womack’s emotional distress was severe.50
There are two key hurdles a plaintiff must clear in order to successfully claim intentional infliction of emotional distress: the second and fourth elements of the tort. Assuming that the first element—intentional action—is met, the plaintiff must meet the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 339–40, 210 S.E.2d at 146–47.
Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148.

$//5(''2&; '2127'(/(7( 

292

$0

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:283

second requirement, that of outrageous conduct.51 In both the employment and nonemployment contexts, the courts generally rely
on Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which requires
that the plaintiff prove that the defendant’s conduct was
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him
to exclaim “Outrageous!”52

This must be more than the hurt feelings or perceived slights
that may occur in the typical American workplace. If the complained-of conduct by a supervisor or other employer representative does not rise to the requisite level, it is dismissed as being
among those “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities” to which the employee “must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened.”53
Not surprisingly, the court in Womack v. Eldridge held that
Rosalie Eldridge’s conduct on behalf of her employer in subjecting
Danny Lee Womack to potential incrimination as a child molester
was outrageous.54 It is worth noting, however, that while the facts
in Womack presented an extreme scenario, clearly meeting the second element of the tort, the decision may have set such a high bar
for what constitutes “outrageous conduct” that the Virginia courts,
returning to Womack as a touchstone, might have viewed the cases
that were to follow as falling short of the mark. In other words,
since the seminal case for intentional infliction of emotional distress was based on such extraordinary facts, it is fair to ask to what
extent subsequent cases that didn’t quite rise to the level of those
extraordinary facts were somehow deemed less outrageous, and
thus viewed in an unfavorable light towards the plaintiff. In this
way, the second element of the tort may not have been an easy one
to meet.
Assuming the third element—causal connection—is met, some
courts (including those in Virginia) have also set a very high standard in order to meet the fourth element, proof of severe emotional

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
Id.
Womack, 215 Va. at 342–43, 210 S.E.2d at 148–49.
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distress.55 The Supreme Court of Virginia’s 1991 ruling in Russo v.
White56 illustrates that difficulty. In that case, Patricia Russo went
on a single date with Burton White, and then decided she did not
want to date him again.57 He began stalking her, calling her house
and hanging up on her 340 times in two months.58 Russo brought
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against White,
alleging that as a proximate result of his intentional conduct, she
experienced “nervousness, sleeplessness, stress and its physical
symptoms, withdrawal from activities . . . [and] lack of concentration at work.”59 She argued that White’s conduct offended any
sense of decency or morality, and that although White did not
speak during the calls, both she and her daughter were threatened
because of the frequency of the calls.60
The Russo court had no trouble finding that White had acted intentionally, thus satisfying the first element of the tort.61 Turning
to the second element, the court elaborated on what constituted
outrageous behavior, stating:
[I]t is insufficient for a defendant to have “acted with an intent which
is tortious or even criminal.” . . . Even if a defendant “has intended to
inflict emotional distress,” or his conduct can be “characterized by
‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort,” the requirement of [outrageousness] has not been satisfied. . . . “Liability has been found only where
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”62

The plaintiff was able to show a causal connection between
White’s actions and her reaction, but she was not to succeed in her
claim.63 Turning to the fourth element, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Russo’s emotional distress did not rise to the level
55. The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Ruth v. Fletcher, 237 Va. 366, 377 S.E.2d 412
(1989), noted that although Womack permitted recovery under a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court was “careful to add limiting language” to the fourth
element of the tort (severe emotional distress) so as to set a very high bar. Id. at 373, 377
S.E.2d 416.
56. 241 Va. 23, 400 S.E.2d 160 (1991).
57. Id. at 25, 400 S.E.2d at 161.
58. Id. at 25, 400 S.E.2d at 161.
59. Id. at 25, 400 S.E.2d at 161–62.
60. Id. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162.
61. Id. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162.
62. Id. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 162.
63. Id. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
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of severity that was required to sustain her claim because she
merely “alleged that she was nervous, could not sleep, experienced
stress, . . . and was unable to concentrate at work.”64 Thus, the
court found that the alleged effect was “not the type of extreme
emotional distress that [was] so severe that no reasonable person
could [have been] expected to endure it.”65 The court noted that:
The term “emotional distress” travels under many labels, such as,
“mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock . . . . It
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.” . . . But liability arises only when the
emotional distress is extreme, and only where the distress inflicted is
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.66

In rejecting Russo’s argument that her condition constituted severe emotional distress, the court stated: “There is no claim, for
example, that she had any objective physical injury caused by the
stress, that she sought medical attention, that she was confined at
home or in a hospital, or that she lost income.”67 These requirements, grafted onto the Restatement’s standard, meant that it was
quite unlikely that a plaintiff would prevail, absent physical injury
resulting from the outrageous conduct.
Justice Hassell’s dissent in Russo focused on the majority’s finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Womack requirement of
severe emotional distress.68 “[N]o reasonable person could or
should be expected to endure the injuries endured by Russo,” he
stated.69 More importantly, the dissent took issue with the majority’s finding that Russo alleged no objective physical injury.70 This
was unnecessary, Justice Hassell explained, because “physical injury is not an element required to establish the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”71

64. Id. at 27–28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
65. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
66. Id. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
67. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
68. Id. at 28–29, 400 S.E.2d at 163–64 (Hassell, J., dissenting) .
69. Id. at 29, 400 S.E.2d at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 30, 400 S.E.2d at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 30, 400 S.E.2d at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting). Justice Hassell noted that
Russo’s amended motion alleged significant emotional distress, as follows: “As a proximate
result of defendant’s intentional acts, plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress resulting
in nervousness, sleeplessness, stress and its physical symptoms, withdrawal from activities
which might necessitate plaintiff leaving her daughter at home, lack of concentration at

$//5(''2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2019]

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS

$0

295

This was an extraordinarily important addition: the Supreme
Court of Virginia abandoned the “physical impact rule” for cases
involving negligence with its 1973 ruling in Hughes v. Moore, but
after recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
a year later in Womack v. Eldridge, the court subsequently pared
back the scope of Womack with its 1991 holding in Russo v. White.
In Russo, the court added the requirement that a plaintiff in an
intentional infliction of emotional distress case prove “objective
physical injury caused by the stress, [or] that she sought medical
attention, [or] that she was confined at home or in a hospital,”72
and that the plaintiff prove the tort by “clear and convincing
evidence.”73
To place this in a broader context, consider that in the 1970s, as
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims began to be recognized by courts across the country, those courts at first required
that whatever emotional distress the plaintiff might have experienced manifest itself in some physical injury to the body, such as
no longer being able to breast feed or suffering a significant weight
loss—that is, a physical injury to the body resulting from the emotional distress. In later decades, however, many state courts
dropped this requirement and instead simply required objective evidence of mental distress.74 This distinction is important, as the
objective evidence could simply be testimony from a doctor that the
plaintiff was suffering from nightmares, or dizziness, or experienced periods of sadness and depression. These constitute “objective evidence of emotional distress” but not a “physical injury to
the body.” But in Virginia, Russo represented a tightening of the
tort’s requirements, adhering to a physical injury standard at a
time when other courts seemed to be more open to claims of emotional distress.75

work to the point where she received a reprimand.” Id. at 29, 400 S.E.2d at 164.
72. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.
73. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 162.
74. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Cambridge Hous. Auth., 823 N.E.2d 1249, 1254–55 (Mass.
2005) (failing to change door locks on rental property which allowed home invasion to take
place caused shock to plaintiff who witnessed harm to a loved one; shock was sufficient to
constitute severe emotional distress); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620 (Wash.
2002) (employee who was mocked for her back injury and was called vulgar names suffered
severe emotional distress); GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605–19 (Tex. 1999)
(employees who were harassed by supervisor experienced anxiety and fear, sought medical
treatment, and were prescribed medication to alleviate their problems suffered severe emotional distress).
75. Not that Virginia courts were alone in tightening the standard. For example, in
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Against this background, we now turn to application of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort in the Virginia workplace.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the
Workplace
The Virginia courts have considered a number of cases in which
employees or former employees have brought claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress against their employers. Five cases
are discussed in chronological order below. Unfortunately for the
plaintiffs in each of these cases, the Virginia courts refused to recognize the workplace actions they complained about as rising to
the level of “outrageous conduct.” As the cases demonstrate, sometimes employees are subject to rude, unfair, or demeaning treatment by their supervisors, but that does not mean they can meet
the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Virginia.
In our first case, plaintiff Fred Seitz was faced with a choice of
resignation or termination by his employer, Phillip Morris.76 Although Seitz had worked for Phillip Morris for more than eight
years, had received several promotions, and was the recipient of
excellent performance evaluations, he was called into his immediate supervisor’s office one day and was “informed . . . without more
specific detail of numerous complaints that had surfaced in recent
weeks regarding the way and manner [in which] he conducted himself with vendors.”77
His supervisor told him that if he resigned, “he would get severance and vacation pay, and the [company] would tell potential employers he resigned.”78 If he was terminated, however, then he
would not get any benefits and prospective employers would be told

1992 the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27–28
(N.C. 1992), that a plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim had to
show a severe and disabling injury, defining the term “severe emotional distress” to mean
“emotional or mental disorder, such as . . . neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia,
or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.” Id. at 26, 28. The plaintiff
in Waddle merely was upset, angry, and had trouble sleeping, and thus failed to demonstrate that she experienced “severe emotional distress.” Id. at 28.
76. Seitz v. Philip Morris, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 428, 428 (1986) (Richmond City).
77. Id. Seitz’s supervisor would only say that he “used coercive and unethical tactics”
in dealing with the vendors. Id.
78. Id.
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of the alleged problems Sietz experienced with vendors.79 Not surprisingly, Seitz chose to resign.80 Soon thereafter, however, he
brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Phillip Morris.81
The court held that Seitz’s claim failed to meet the first element
of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort—specifically,
that there was no allegation of a specific purpose on the part of
Seitz’s supervisor “to inflict emotional hurt or an allegation defendant so intended his specific conduct or knew or should have known
emotional injury would result thereby.”82 Thus, the defendant
employer’s demurrer to his count of emotional distress was
sustained.83
Our second case involved former employee Joseph Ellison, who
brought a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
against his former employer, St. Mary’s Hospital in Richmond, alleging that he had been treated so badly that he had to leave his
employment.84 Ellison claimed the hospital “gave him unfair work
assignments, criticized his work in front of others, told him he had
an ‘attitude problem,’ took him into an office and questioned him
about drug use, gave him a choice of submitting his resignation or
being fired, and barred him from the hospital grounds.”85
The court held that Ellison’s allegations, even if true, did not rise
to the level of “extreme and outrageous” conduct needed to
prevail under Virginia precedent.86 The court stated that Ellison’s allegations
do no more than detail a scenario carried out daily in the workplace.
Every day, workers are criticized about their job performance and are
undoubtedly given assignments which they feel are unfair and not
part of their job description. Such conduct can hardly be given the dignity of being elevated to the level of “outrageous and intolerable in
that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality.” To make such actions as plaintiff alleges actionable
would be to create chaos in the work place. Workers must not be so

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 428, 431.
Id. at 431–32.
Id. at 432.
Ellison v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 8 Va. Cir. 330, 330–31 (1987) (Henrico County).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 331.
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thin-skinned as to allow themselves to be unnerved by the rough and
tumble of everyday life.87

Our third case involved a plaintiff named Lorine Spence, who
brought an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against her employer, arguing that the company’s failure to make
timely payments mandated by the Industrial Commission of Virginia as a result of Spence’s job injury award was outrageous conduct.88 The court disagreed, stating that the employer’s “failure to
make payments and subsequent filing of court actions and appeals
questioning liability simply does not equate with the extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary for an emotional distress claim without accompanying physical injury described in Womack.”89
In our fourth case, a former employee of the Norfolk Sheriff’s
Department, Queen Starks, brought an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim against her former employer,90 alleging
that a co-worker, Diane Woods, had stated to other employees that
Starks was a lesbian and had said to her that she didn’t want another employee to “catch anything” from her.91 Applying the Russo
standard, the court rejected Stark’s claim, stating: “Instances of
pettiness, vindictiveness, rudeness, and mendacity among employees of large organizations and, indeed, among mankind, are innumerable.”92 The court concluded that the acts in question were “not
so outrageous and extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency.”93
The court also found Starks’ claim wanting with respect to the
fourth element of the tort, severe emotional distress, noting that
Starks only alleged severe emotional distress and severe depression, which the court defined, with the help of Webster’s Dictionary, as “[d]ejection; sadness; [or] gloom.”94 Stated the court: “Dejection, sadness, and gloom are emotions almost everyone who enters
the workplace suffers at some time. Without more, they are hardly
87. Id. at 332.
88. Spence v. E.S.I.S., Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 366, 366–67, 372 (1989) (Virginia Beach City).
The court added that since Spence had failed to meet one of the prongs of the Womack test,
it need not look to the other three. Id. at 372–73 (citing Johnson v. McKee Baking Co., 398
F. Supp. 201, 209 (W.D. Va. 1975)).
89. Id. at 373.
90. Starks v. McCabe, 49 Va. Cir. 554, 554 (1998) (Norfolk City).
91. Id. at 555.
92. Id. at 558–59.
93. Id. at 559.
94. Id.
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‘so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure’
them.”95 The court ruled that Starks’ “bare assertion”96 that her coworker’s statements caused her “severe emotional distress and severe depression” did not satisfy the fourth element, and sustained
the defendant employer’s demurrer.97
Finally, we have the 2011 case of Paul Blakeman, who brought
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against his employer when he was fired for testing positive for cocaine as a result
of a random drug test.98 Blakeman complained that his employer
failed to adhere to the in-house collection procedure and then refused to invalidate the drug test.99 The court held that requiring
an employee to submit to a random drug test did not constitute
outrageous conduct; thus, Blakeman did not meet the second prong
of the four part test.100 Further, the court held, Blakeman did “not
allege any objective physical injury caused by the stress” of having
to take a drug test, nor did he require medical attention, and thus
he did not meet the fourth prong of the test either.101
As is seen from these decisions, Virginia employees typically do
not prevail in their intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. Faced with the high standard of meeting the second element of the tort—“outrageous conduct”—as set forth in Womack,
coupled with the fourth element’s physical injury standard set
forth in Russo, it would appear that the Virginia courts are willing
to abide a wide range of mistreatment by employers without finding liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.102 However, in recent years a line of cases has developed in which Virginia
employees have had greater success against their employers:
claims involving sexual harassment. We turn to those cases in the
following section.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Blakeman v. Emergency USA, 83 Va. Cir. 269, 269–70 (2011) (Fairfax County).
99. Id. at 270.
100. Id. at 278–79.
101. Id. at 278.
102. As these cases show, the fourth element of the tort, severity, “is perhaps the most
difficult to apply to the facts of a case.” Calloway v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. Cir. 400, 417–
18 (2018) (Augusta County) (plaintiff, a visitor to a prison, “was upset, and crying” and
“shocked, frightened, and felt degraded and humiliated” when she was subjected to a strip
search, but the court rejected her claim that she suffered severe emotional distress).
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B. Development of the Russo Exception: Sexual Harassment and
Employer Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
A number of cases show that sexual harassment claims that
arise in the workplace will be treated differently than might be expected under the Russo doctrine. As noted above, Russo v. White
stands for the proposition that allegations of stress, humiliation,
embarrassment, injury to reputation, and mental anguish unaccompanied by objective physical injury, medical attention, or lost
income are not sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress.103 But what if an employee brings a sexual
harassment case framed as a tort claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress? The answer has changed over the course of the
last two decades.
In 1991, the Richmond City Circuit Court decided the case of
Hazlewood v. Mabe.104 There, employees of Richmond Newspapers
claimed that a coworker, Mabe, “made undesirable, sexually suggestive physical contact with [them]; namely, in the form of pinching, grabbing, and/or fondling the plaintiff’s posterior or genitals,
in a sexually suggestive manner.”105 The plaintiffs alleged Mabe’s
conduct “detrimentally affected their psychological well-being and
has consequently interfered with their ability to adequately perform their duties in the work place . . . and that the plaintiffs have
each suffered tremendous emotional distress, both at the work
place and intruding on their home lives.”106 Applying the Russo
standard, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show severe distress, such as objective physical injury, seeking medical
treatment, home or hospital confinement, or lost wages, and
granted the defendant employer’s demurrer.107
A significant shift began a few years later, however, with the
1997 decision in Hygh v. Geneva Enterprises, Inc.108 That case involved Vernetta Hygh, a receptionist at a car dealership called Geneva Enterprises.109 Her supervisor, a general sales manager
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991).
24 Va. Cir. 289 (1991) (Richmond City).
Id. at 290.
Id. at 293.
Id.
47 Va. Cir. 569 (1997) (Fairfax County).
Id. at 570.
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named Beltran, continually subjected Hygh to “sexually suggestive, harassing comments and acts.” Beltran’s harassment culminated on August 23, 1996, when, during work hours and upon Beltran’s suggestion, Hygh and Beltran first drove to a store and
purchased a CD for Hygh to play in her car.110 Rather than returning to the car dealership, however, Beltran drove to a secluded
spot, parked the car, grabbed Hygh by the neck and attempted to
force her to perform a sex act on him.111 She resisted, and then resigned from her job a few days later.112
Hygh brought a number of claims against Beltran and the company, including a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, before the Fairfax County Circuit Court.113 The employer demurred, arguing that Hygh failed to plead the necessary elements
of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under
Hughes—specifically, that she did not sufficiently allege the required elements of intentional conduct, a nexus between defendant’s conduct and the emotional distress, nor the severity of the
distress.114
Hygh argued that her claim satisfied the necessary elements,
and “that the only element in question [was] whether [her] emotional distress was severe.”115 She “alleged ‘objectively verifiable
evidence’ of her distress including, but not limited to, inability to
return to work or college and consultation with mental health care
professionals.”116
The court held that a victim of sexual assault experiences
trauma which greatly differed from the type suffered by the plaintiff in Russo, in which the court required a showing of physical injury resulting from the outrageous conduct.117 Rather, held the
court, the plaintiff, “an alleged victim of sexual assault, need not
plead with graphic specificity any additional objective physical injury.”118 The court said: “The victim of a sexual assault clearly experiences severe emotional distress that no reasonable person
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 570, 574.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 569.
See id. at 569, 571.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574–75.
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could be expected to endure.”119 Therefore, the employer’s demurrer was overruled and Hygh could pursue her claim, even without
a showing of physical injury.120
A case that arose three years later, Padilla v. Silver Diner, involved a server named Annamarie Padilla who worked at the Silver Diner restaurant.121 For the entire eleven months she worked
there, Padilla was subjected to continuous sexual harassment by a
co-worker at the restaurant, Dominic Williams.122 He “proposition[ed] her on numerous occasions in an extremely vulgar manner,” spanked her rear end, placed his face against her breasts,
asked her when they were going to have sex, and once caused her
to burn herself when he pushed her against a hot oven.123
Padilla repeatedly told Williams that she was not interested in
him and was offended by his behavior.124 She complained to her
supervisor and the operating manager at the restaurant several
times.125 Other wait staff also complained about Williams and
other employees, and even brought their complaints to the president and vice president of the company, but no action was ever
taken.126 Finally, Padilla stopped working at the Silver Diner, and
brought her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Williams and the company, claiming liability under the
theory of respondeat superior.127 She filed her claim in Virginia
Beach City Circuit Court.128
As in the Hygh case heard in Fairfax County, the Virginia Beach
City Circuit Court held that although Russo v. White stands for the
proposition that “allegations of stress, humiliation, embarrassment, injury to reputation, and mental anguish unaccompanied by
objective physical injury, medical attention, or lost income are not
sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 575.
Id.
63 Va. Cir. 50, 51 (2000) (Virginia Beach City).
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 51.
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distress,”129 there was an exception to this rule. Specifically, stated
the court,
Russo and its progeny addressed emotional distress claims that were
“independent of any physical injury and unaccompanied by any physical impact,” . . . and clearly differ from cases involving physical or
sexual assaults . . . . In the cases at hand, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged physical and emotional injuries resulting from physical
and sexual abuse by Williams and Miller. It is apparent that Miller’s
and Williams’ alleged conduct was so outrageous and offensive as to
cause the Plaintiffs severe emotional distress as well as physical injuries . . . . Additionally, the Plaintiffs told Williams and Miller on multiple occasions that their conduct was unwelcome, and it may be inferred that Williams and Miller intended to cause the Plaintiffs
distress by continuing to sexually assault and harass them. Accordingly, the Defendants’ demurrer is overruled.130

Then, in a case decided the same year, Oelgoetz v. Appalachian
Appraisal Services, Roanoke City Circuit Court held that where a
female supervisor had engaged in unwanted propositioning of a
male subordinate, his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress properly survived the defendant’s demurrer, even though
the court expressed skepticism about whether her conduct was
“sufficiently ‘extreme and outrageous’ to overcome a Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s evidence.”131
In 2005, in Hazzis v. Modjadidi the Norfolk City Circuit Court
heard extensive allegations of sexual harassment brought by dental hygienist Magdalend Hazzis.132 Specifically, she alleged that
Dr. Osama Modjadidi, a dentist and employee of Konikoff Family
Dentistry, used his position of authority to “forcibly rub[] his body
against hers, unsnap[] her bra when her hands were engaged with
the film processor,” touch her buttocks and breasts, and make “several offensive sexual remarks.”133 She claimed that this sexual harassment caused her “extreme mental and emotional anguish, physical injuries, and medical expenses.”134
The court compared the sexual harassment claim in Padilla to
the claim brought by Ms. Hazzis, and determined that the physical
injuries in Padilla were more pronounced than those complained
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id. at 55; see also Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991).
Padilla, 63 Va. Cir. at 55 (citation omitted).
51 Va. Cir. 334, 334–36 (2000) (Roanoke City).
69 Va. Cir. 385, 385 (2005) (Norfolk City).
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 386.
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of by Ms. Hazzis.135 But joining the other three circuit courts, the
Norfolk Court held that their reasoning was analogous.136 “Cases
dealing with elements of physical sexual harassment are distinguishable from cases like Russo where the allegations dealt only
with non-tactile torts.”137 The court concluded that the “egregiousness and physical nature of the alleged conduct, along with the
plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress to the point of vomiting
blood [were] sufficient to overrule the Defendant[] [employer’s] demurrers.”138
The most recent case of this type was decided in 2012. There, in
Magallon v. Wireless Unlimited Inc.,139 the Fairfax County Circuit
Court, relying on its earlier ruling in Hygh, found that the plaintiff
alleged outrageous and intolerable behavior when she claimed her
former manager called her sexually demeaning names, threatened
her with violence, demeaned her character by accusing her of having sexual relations with the business owner, and took her car and
house keys when she rebuffed his sexual advances.140 The plaintiff
had “sought medical attention for her fear, anxiety, depression,
and frequent vomiting . . . . [and] was prescribed Zoloft and another
medication to control her vomiting” and post-traumatic stress
disorder.141
As seen from these decisions, the Virginia circuit courts have
evolved in their view of intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims involving sexual harassment in the workplace. Although it
is sometimes the case that the victim of sexual harassment can
demonstrate the type of physical injury and need for medical attention envisioned by Russo, these courts seem to demonstrate
quite a sympathetic view towards plaintiffs who do not produce
that level of evidence. As the Hygh court stated, a sexual assault

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 389.
Id.
85 Va. Cir. 460 (2012) (Fairfax County).
Id. at 462–63, 468–69.
Id. at 463.
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victim “need not plead with graphic specificity any additional objective physical injury,”142 as sexual assault victims experience “severe emotional distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.”143
Before we return to the plight of Linda Bodewig set forth at the
beginning of this article, a brief detour is in order: what role does
Workers’ Compensation play in these cases?
C. The Relationship Between the Virginia Workers’ Compensation
Act and Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Briefly stated, the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act provides
benefits for injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment.144 The Act provides the exclusive remedy for employees seeking relief from such injuries, but both conditions must be
met; that is, the injury must both arise out of the employment and
in the course of employment.145 In other words, as the Supreme
Court of Virginia held in its first decision interpreting the Act,
Bradshaw v. Aronovitch,146
[t]he expressions “arising out of” and “in the course of” the employment are not synonymous; but the words “arising out of” are construed
to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and the words “in the
course of” to refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which
it occurred. 147

Elaborating on these terms, the Bradshaw Court explained that
“[a]n accident occurs ‘in the course of the employment’ when it
takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where
the employee may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.”148 Further, the court found, the Act requires “a
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is

142. Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 51 (2000) (Virginia Beach City) (quoting Hygh
v. Geneva Enters., Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 569, 575 (1997) (Fairfax County)).
143. Id.
144. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 2017 & Cum. Supp.
2019).
145. Id. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 2017 & Cum. Supp. 2019).
146. 170 Va. 329, 196 S.E. 684 (1938).
147. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
148. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
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required to be performed and the resulting injury.”149 The court explained that “if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation . . . then it arises ‘out
of’ the employment.”150 The Act, however, “excludes an injury
which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the
workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.”151 In other words, the danger to which the employee is exposed must be “peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood.”152
So what does this mean for an employee working in the Commonwealth of Virginia who suffers what he or she believes to be
severe emotional distress stemming from the outrageous conduct
of an employer? The answer depends on whether the court finds
that the complained-of action meets the Act’s definition of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
For example, in Abney v. Wimer, the court considered the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim brought by Kimberly
Abney against her employer, the J.C. Penney Company.153 Abney
was summoned to her supervisor’s office, where she was informed
that she was fired.154 Her supervisor then enlisted the aid of another employee, Nevin Wimer, in escorting Abner out of his office
and off the store premises.155 Abney claimed that Wimer assaulted
her and “forcibly lifted her up and out of the chair and intentionally
threw [her] to the floor causing [Abney] to break three bones in her
right foot.”156
The employer argued that Abney’s intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, and the court agreed.157
Stated the court:

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
60 Va. Cir. 87, 87 (2002) (Norfolk City).
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 88, 91.
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Every event in this scenario, the Plaintiff’s going into her supervisor’s
office to discuss a work-related matter, the termination, and the requests that Plaintiff depart from the premises, was work-related and,
therefore, arose out of her employment. Even the alleged assault arose
out of Plaintiff’s employment, for it involved a work-related matter.158

Thus, the court found that Abney’s injuries “arose out of [her]
employment” with defendant J.C. Penney.159 Further, Abney’s injuries occurred at her place of employment, during working hours,
and in circumstances directly related to her employment—or at
least directly related to her discharge from employment.160 Her exclusive remedy, therefore, was under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (which, of course, limited her potential damages, unlike an intentional tort claim).161
By contrast, in Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co., an employee named Texanna Middlekauff brought an action against her
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming
from harassment and verbal abuse from her supervisor.162 Specifically, she alleged in her complaint that her supervisor, Tony Richards, “intentionally sought to humiliate her in front of other employees by making derisive comments concerning the fact that she
was overweight, as well as sexist and other belittling remarks.”163
The trial court held that the action was barred by the exclusivity
provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act,164 but the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that her claim was not barred by
the exclusivity provision because she did “not allege an ‘injury by
accident’ ‘arising out’ of her employment.”165 Thus, the exclusivity
provision did not bar Middlekauff’s action and she could proceed
with her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
the defendant employer.166
The same result was reached with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising out of the sexual harassment in Padilla v. Silver Diner,167 the case discussed earlier where
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1994).
Id. at 151, 439 S.E.2d at 394, 395.
Id. at 151, 439 S.E.2d at 395–96 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
Id. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 396–97.
Id. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 396–97.
63 Va. Cir. 50, 51–53, 55 (2000) (Virginia Beach City).
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the waitress was continually harassed by her supervisor for more
than a year. There, the court held:
The Act applies to injuries by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment and occupational diseases. An injury is “by accident”
when it (1) “appeared suddenly at a particular time and place and
upon a particular occasion, (2) . . . was caused by an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event, and (3) . . . resulted in an obvious
mechanical or structural change in the human body.” An injury that
is the result of the willful and intentional assault of either a fellow
employee or a third person does not prevent the injury from being accidental within the meaning of the Act.168

Thus, held the court, while as a general rule an intentional tort
of an employer or a fellow employee would be found to be within
the scope of the Virginia’s Workers’ Compensation Act and thus
the employee’s exclusive remedy,169 the assault must be “personal
to the employee and not directed against him as an employee or
because of his employment.”170
In Padilla’s case, her fellow employees both admitted that they
were trying to get her to succumb to their sexual advances; thus,
their assaults were of a personal nature, directed against Padilla
as a woman, not as an employee.171 Therefore, the court concluded,
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar Padilla’s claim
as her injuries did not arise out of employment as required by the
Act.172 Further, held the court, Padilla “sufficiently alleged physical and emotional injuries resulting from physical and sexual
abuse” by her fellow employees, their alleged conduct was outrageous, and they intended to cause her distress by continued sexual
assault and harassment.173 Thus, the defendant employer’s demurrer was overruled.174
In summary, if an assault, including sexual harassment, is not
directed against an employee because of his or her employment,
168. Id. at 53 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 53; Haddon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 398–99, 389 S.E.2d 712, 713–
14 (1990).
170. Padilla, 63 Va. Cir. at 53 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Hazelwood, 249 Va. 369,
373, 457 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1995)); see also City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 162–65,
335 S.E.2d 259, 260–62 (1985) (holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a
personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship).
171. Padilla, 63 Va. Cir. at 54.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 55.
174. Id.
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then it does not “arise out of the employment.”175 In those circumstances, if an employee brings an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim arising from such an assault or harassment, the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar these claims because the injury is not a compensable injury by accident.176
III. BACK TO THE BEGINNING: APPLYING VIRGINIA LAW TO
BODEWIG
When we left our protagonist, Linda Bodewig, she had filed a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her
employer after Bodewig was strip-searched in an effort to assuage
a customer’s concerns that she had stolen the customer’s money.177
Like other courts, the Oregon courts applied the same four elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1)
intent; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) a causal connection between the
conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress
was severe.178 The Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that a jury could find
the employer acted intentionally, and that the manager’s conduct
went “beyond the limits of social toleration and reckless of the conduct’s predictable effects” on Linda Bodewig.179 Having satisfied
the tort elements of intentionally engaging in outrageous conduct,

175. Hazelwood, 249 Va. at 373, 457 S.E.2d at 58.
176. Lichtman v. Knouf, 248 Va. 138, 139–40, 445 S.E.2d 114, 114–15 (1994); see also
Reamer v. Nat’l Serv. Industries, 237 Va. 466, 467–68, 470–71, 377 S.E.2d 627, 628–30
(1989) (woman working alone in a furniture store who was sexually assaulted by man who
entered the store through employees’ entrance, forcibly took her into the bathroom, and
raped her twice before robbing the store was victim of sexual assault that was personal to
her and not directed at her because she was an employee, so her claims not barred by Workers’ Comp.); City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 162, 164–65, 335 S.E.2d 259, 260–
62 (1985) (ticket-seller at city-owned theatre who was molested by her supervisor at the
place of and during the hours of employment, did not suffer an accident arising out of the
employment, since there was no causal connection between the injury and the employment
as the finding that the employee would have been equally exposed to the risk of the hazard
of being molested outside of work); Morgan v. Brophy, 94 Va. Cir. 301, 301–03 (2016) (Chesapeake City) (employee claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against employer where her supervisor cursed her and shoved boxes at her was victim of an assault,
and her injury did not arise out of the employment as it was personal, so the Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar her claim); Morgan v. MDC Holdings, Inc., 54 Va. Cir. 45, 45, 52
(2000) (Fairfax County) (plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a fellow employee and her claim
was not barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act).
177. Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 658–59 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
178. Id. at 660–62.
179. Id. at 661–62.
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the court then turned to the elements of causation and severe emotional distress, and held as follows:
If the facts presented are believed, plaintiff suffered shock, humiliation and embarrassment, suffering that was not merely transient.
Plaintiff characterized herself as a shy, modest person, and said that
she had two or three sleepless nights, cried a lot and still gets nervous
and upset when she thinks about the incident. Concededly, this element of the tort has been, and still is, troublesome to courts. K-Mart
contends there is no objective evidence of the distress, such as medical,
economic or social problems. In Rockhill v. Pollard, . . . plaintiff became nervous and suffered from sleeplessness and a loss of appetite
over a period of about two years. The court said: “Defendant belittles
these symptoms, but it is the distress which must be severe, not the
physical manifestations.”180

The court concluded that Bodewig’s distress “was more than that
which a person might be reasonably expected to pay as the price of
living among people.”181 The court concluded that Bodewig’s evidence of severe emotional distress was sufficient to go to a jury.182
But what if Linda Bodewig was not an Oregon resident, but rather a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia? How would she
have fared then?
First, it seems clear that Bodewig could meet the first three elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
a somewhat analogous case decided in Virginia last year, Calloway
v. Commonwealth, the Augusta County Circuit Court evaluated
the claim of a visitor to a detention facility who was subjected to a
strip search.183 There, the court said:
It cannot be seriously contested that Calloway has pled the first three
elements of IIED. First, she alleges that the VDOC employees acted
intentionally, i.e., that they knew they had no legal reason to detain
her or subject her to a strip search; a jury could reasonably conclude
that an officer should have known that an unwarranted strip search
could likely cause emotional distress. Second, an unjustified strip
search strikes the Court as so invasive a procedure that any reasonable person could (perhaps would) describe it as “outrageous,” if not

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 662 (quoting Rockhill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 28, 32 (Or. 1971)).
Id.
Id.
99 Va. Cir. 400, 400 (2018) (Augusta County).
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justified. Finally, Calloway clearly alleges a causal connection between the VDOC employees’ conduct and the stress she claims. Those
issues properly are jury questions.184

However, turning to the fourth element of the tort, severity,
which the court characterized as “perhaps the most difficult to apply to the facts of a case,” the court held that the plaintiff failed to
carry her burden.185 Even though Calloway “was upset, and crying”
and “shocked, frightened, and felt degraded and humiliated”186
when she was subjected to the strip search, the court rejected her
claim that she suffered severe emotional distress under the Russo
standard.187
Recall that Patricia Russo experienced “nervousness, sleeplessness, [and] stress.”188 Similarly, Linda Bodewig experienced nervousness, sleeplessness, and stress.189 However, under the standard
set forth in Russo v. White, Bodewig would fail to meet the fourth
prong of the tort. She had no objective physical injury caused by
the stress, she didn’t seek medical attention, nor was she was confined at home or in a medical facility.190
Bodewig might also face an argument by the defendant employer, K-Mart, that the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act provided her exclusive remedy. The actions of the K-Mart manager in
subjecting her to a strip search at her place of employment, during
working hours, and in circumstances directly related to her employment (specifically, in response to a customer’s accusation of
theft by the employee), arguably led to her injury “by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.”191 Bodewig’s counter
argument would be that there was no accident giving rise to an
injury, and that would seem to be a convincing argument under the
precedent set by Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance. Company192 as
discussed above.
So let’s assume the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Act would not bar Linda Bodewig’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. As noted above, Bodewig would

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 418.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
Id.
Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 25, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161 (1991).
Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 662 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
See id.
Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 53 (2000) (Virginia Beach City).
247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
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not prevail in Virginia as she did in Oregon because of the exacting
requirements of Russo. But why should this be the case, given the
numerous Virginia circuit court holdings that employees who suffer from sexual harassment can prevail without meeting Russo’s
additional requirement of the tort’s fourth prong? More critically,
why should this additional requirement be the law at all, since, as
Justice Hassell made clear in his Russo dissent, physical injury is
not a necessary element under traditional intentional infliction of
emotional distress analysis? Frankly, it seems an odd result that a
woman like Linda Bodewig, who is strip searched and who suffers
the predicable response of sleeplessness, nervousness, and stress,
will not recover damages, while an employee who is subjected to
repeated propositioning at work, like Annemarie Padilla, can succeed on her claim.
A brief review of a century of Virginia court decisions concerning
the issue of damages for emotional distress, arising in various tort
contexts, shows that the Virginia courts have not been rigid in
their approach, but rather have shifted their analysis over time as
we gain a better appreciation for the nuances of mental suffering—
what causes it, how it manifests itself, and what constitutes severity. This shift is evidenced, for example, in negligence cases, where
the court abandoned the requirement of physical impact and
moved to the broader standard of finding injury from “the natural
result of fright or shock.”193 No argument is made here to change
the four basic elements of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. Requiring a plaintiff to show that a defendant intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct, that which “shocks the
conscience,” is a fair burden; it is a standard that is appropriately
difficult to meet (although as societal standards change, outrageousness may be even harder to demonstrate). But the question
of what constitutes “severe emotional distress,” caused by the defendant, is one that the Virginia courts should show a willingness
to reconsider. Lower courts have done so in some recent sexual harassment cases. Abandoning the extra burden Russo places on
plaintiffs would lead to a better, fairer result in all circumstances
involving employer and employee, not just in sexual harassment
claims. The result would be a better workplace and a more balanced view of employee rights. Let us hope Virginia revisits the
question again soon.

193.

Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973).

